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ABSTRACT 
The results of lightning protection analyses and tests are weighed against the present set of waivers to 
the NASA lightning protection specification. The significant analyses and tests are contrasted with the 
release of a new and more realistic lightning protection specification, in September 1990, that resulted 
in an inordinate number of waivers. After the first decade of Shuttle flight the Shuttle remains vulnerable 
to the effects of lightning. A variety of lightning protection analyses and tests of the Shuttle propulsion 
elements, the Solid Rocket Booster, the External Tank, and the Space Shuttle Main Engine, have been 
conducted. These tests range from the sensitivity of solid propellant during shipping to penetration of 
cryogenic tanks during flight. 
The Shuttle propulsion elements have the capability to survive certain levels of lightning strikes at 
certain times during transportation, launch site operations and flight. Changes are being evaluated that 
may improve the odds of withstanding a mapr lightning strike. The Solid Rocket Booster is the most 
likely propulsion element io survive if systems tunnel bond straps are improved. An initial decision not to 
harden the Space Shuttle Main Engine to lightning has been reversed. Wiring improvements have 
already been incorporated and mapr lightning protection tests have been conducted. The External 
Tank remains vulnerable to burn-through penetration of its skin. Proposed design improvements 
include the use of a composite nose cone and conductive or laminated thermal protection system 
coatings. 
INTRODUCTION 
Lightning protection concerns and the resulting analyses, tests, design changes or waivers for the 
Shuttle propulsion elements are summarized from the perspective of the Systems Analysis And 
Integration Laboratory of the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). Shuttle propulsion elements are the 
responsibility of MSFC and are differentiated from the Shuttle Orbiter which is the responsibility of the 
Johnson Space Center (JSC). There are three major Shuttle propulsion elements: (1) Solid Rocket 
Booster, (2) External Tank and (3) Space Shuttle Main Engine. The relationship of the Shuttle 
propulsion elements and the Shuttle Orbiter to the overall Space Shuttle is depicted in Fig.1. 
All Space Shuttle elements, and the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) launch site, share a common 
lightning protection specification: NSTS 07636, Revision E. This revision was released in September 
1990. The specification subdivides lightning characteristics to simulate the aspects of a mapr lightning 
strike: there is an initial component A, (200 kA peak, 500 ps); an intermediate component B. (4.2 kA 
peak, 10 coulombs); and a continuing component C, (400 A, 200 coulombs). Other lightning 
components defined by the specification account for restrikes and multiple bursts. Test equipment has 
been devised to Simulate the various aspects of lightning protection. 
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Flguro 1. Shuttle Propulsion Elements 
EXTERNAL TANK 
The External Tank (ET) is an aluminum vessel, 47 m (154 ft) in length and 8.4 m (28 ft) in diameter. A 
diagram identifying the major mmponents is uhown in Fg.2. Two Soid Rocket Boosters and the Orbiter 
are attached. The thkkness of the 2219 aluminum skin varies from 2 to 3.6 mm (80 to 140 mils). 
Insulation, 1.9 to 3.8 cm (0.75 to 1.5 inches) thick, is required to minimize cryogenic boiloff and to 
provide protection against aerodynamic heating. The Tank has three main components: the Liquid 
Oxygen ( L a )  tank, bcated under the fornard ojive; the intertanl< sectbn; and the att Oquid hydrogen 
(LH2) tank. External CaMe trays encbse fluld Ones, pressurization gas Ones, linear shaped charges, and 
electrical cable~s. Avlonks are located in the nose cone and intertank areas. 
Flgun 2. External Tank 
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Bum-through of the External Tank is one Os the most s e w s  lightning threats to the Shuttle propulsion 
cllements because the external tanks are prone to penetration of the sWn that could result in hydrogen 
ignition or oxygen burning or bss of pressurizatbn. During ascent of the Space Shuttle the External 
Tank is a potential attach point for lightning. The External Tank is protected by a catenary wire system 
while on the bunch pad and 18 protected against launch into severe weather by stdct launch commit 
criteria. However, there remains a posSibiOty that prediction of triggered lightning strokes durfng boost 
may be beyond the capability of completely reliable weather prediction and therefore analyses, tests, 
and design changes continue with the objective of improving compliance with the lightning protection 
specification. 
The External Tank can probably withstand a lightning strike to the lightning tod located at the forward 
most tip of the tank nose cone. The rod also functions aerodynamically to reduce thermal protection 
requirements. Tests (11 on a production nose cone demonstrated the capability of the lightning rod to 
distribute full lightning currents Into the nose cone with no discernible damage. Analysis and tests verify 
that there would be no damage to the LO2 tank, the intertank, or the LH2 tank resulting from a lightning 
strike to the lightning rod. 
Lightning can strike at any akihrde but it is most likely to trigger a lightning strike at altitudes above 460 m 
(1500 ft). The lightning protection specification applies to a worst case mapr lightning strike. Practical 
considerations, though difficult to substantiate, suggest that the External Tank may realistically 
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Flgura 3. Typical Cross Section of the TPS 
encounter less severe Eghtning strikes. When a lightning strike uses a moving space vehicle as part of 
its path from a ckud to ground or to another ckud, it establishes a step leader path for the first return 
stroke and return stroke currents usually conllwe tor several milliseconds. If the whole surface is 
conductive, the attach pia moves back In relarively smooth motion due to the toward motion of the 
vehicle, but if the surface is covered with Insulation the lightning arcs through the insulation and 
attaches to the aluminum skin at one point. The initial lightning attach point clings to one spot and the 
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lightning channel bends abng the insulated surface forming a heal just above the surface of the 
insulation. The lightning channel attaches k a new point futther along the length of the vehicle when 
the heal is close enough and the voltage is high enough to arc through the insulation. Before this 
occurs, the dwell time at the initial attach point may be sufficient to burn through the underlying 
aluminum skin of the LO2 and LH2 tanks. Details of the flight vehide insulation are shown in Fg.3. 
Commercial aircraft typically suwive two lghtning strikes per year. The Saturn V, Apollo 12, mission 
sunrived hrvo strikes during launch and wenl on to the second successful Lunar landing. The conductive 
skin of aircraft and the Saturn vehicle sweep the lightning channel abng the surface without penetrating 
the skin whereas the insulated surface of the External Tank not only increases the dwell time but tends 
to narrowly focus the arc and enhance the potential to penetrate the walls. 
The charge imparted to the skin of a vehicle by a swep stroke is the product of amperes and dweii time. 
Dwell time is highly dependar4 on insuiatkn breakdown characteristics and is difficult to predict. There is 
a minimal data base on the effects of a swepl strokes on thickly insulated surfaces, and testing is 
expensive and diffiarlt to condud. However, the charge imparted to the skin of the External Tank from a 
swept stmke can be less than the spedfied 200 coukmb level for a standing vehicle. Although amount 
of charge from a swept stroke may not be known, the amount of charge necessary to penetrate the skin 
of the External Tank can be determined thrwgh test and analysis. 
A number of tests have been conducted to evaluate tank puncture and the effects of thick insulation. 
For example, elaborate coupon testing was performed usi aluminum coupons covered with thermal 
insulation and stressed to flight pressures of 34,475 N/m to 275,800 N/m (5 to 40 psi) and liquid 
nitrogen (LN2) temperatures. A 2.5 mm (100 mil) panel marginally survived 31 coubmbs. A 3.6 mm (140 
nil) panel punctured but a 4 mm (le0 mil) panel survived at a 75 coubmb level (21. 
?! 2 
Designs for improving the capablllty to survlve a server lightning strike are being evaluated. Overlaying 
the thermal protedion insulation wlth laminated layers of thin aluminum and nonconductive adhesive, 
similar to the Soid Rocket Booster rail car covers, may offer soMions. An 2 mm (80 mil) panel covered 
with 6.4 mm (2.5 mil) aluminum tape and adhesive withstood 75 coulombs [2). A normally 
nonconductive insulated panel required twice this thickness to withstand the same charge level. The 
outer foil separates from the surface being protected, probably due to the escaping adhesive gasses, 
and diverts the lightning arc. Painting the insulatbn with copper impregnated paint has also shown 
considerable promise and the incorporation of a composite nose cone is under consideration. 
The launch pad lightning protection system consists of three major systems: (1) a catenary wire 
instrumentation system thal measurn lbhtning wave form and peak current, (2) a system that measures 
induced vottage and currea fbw In the vehicle and ground support equipment, and (3) an optical 
system that determines the lightning attach point. 
An updating d the ground based field mlll netwodc is scheduled to be operational by the summer of 
1991. This system oor\sista of 37 field nrik covering a l  launch sites at the KSC. Data will be automatically 
coiiected in a central data fadllty. -
The LO2 and LH2 gas ptessurizatbn lnes are Imr tan l  planned lightning attach points. The LO2 line 
runs the length of the vehicle and both lines are uninsulated. Lightning can sweep along the 
uninsulated lines when the vehicle Is moving without dwelling bng enough to bum through. The lines 
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have the CapabiRy af surviving a swept stroke when vehicle vekcity is above 20 Ws (64 fps). A waiver is 
in effect because the pressurization lines will puncture if the vehicle is stationary. 
The cable trays were verified to withstand the dired effects of a 25 kA lightning strike derived from an 
earlier reisam Of the !ightdng protection specification. The R8V E specification calls for 200 kA. 
Analyses of indited effects, the coupling of undesired current and vottage into electrical cable 
harnesses from ne-y structure or fluid and gas lines, must likewise be upgraded to the 200 kA level. 
The major waivers to the External Tank invdve tank penetration inclusive of the nose cone, LO2 tank, 
LH2 tank, and aft dome of the LH2 tank. A number of analyses and tests have been requested. One 
test, to evaluate the effects of a lightning strike to a simulated insulated liquid oxygen tank, may be 
performed at MSFC Huntsville in early 1991. 
SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINE 
The engine using the cryogenics from the External Tank is hated in the Orbiter. The Space Shuttle 
Main Engine (SSME) is actually three engines having an engine controller mounted to each engine. 
The mntrollers contain -ai computers necessary to process sensor signak, and issue control signals 
to hydraulic actuaton and igniters. The existing controller is referred to as Block I but this version is 
scheduled to be replaced by a Bkck II controller in 1992. The controllers are wired to engine 
components and to Orbiter interlace wiring. Features of the engine are shown in Fig.4. Note that the 
main engine is largely protected within the Orbiter boat tail but there remains concerns for cable 
shielding of the Bkdc II engine controller and soma concern for direct effects of a strike to the engine 
nozzle. 
F)gun 4. Space Shuttle Main Engine 
A decision was made in 1975 that the main engine was not subject to direct effects of a lightning strike 
and it was believed that the added cost, weight and schedule of guarding against direct lightning strikes 
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was not justified. Ratbnab included consideration that the engine was unlikely to be a primary lightning 
conductor during boost by virtue of protection afforded by the Orbiter structure and the booster plume 
and that the emne is not operational durlng landing and can, if Struck by lightning, be repaired. 
After the Atlas inddent in 1987, it was discovered that.certain shielding practices responsible for the 
Atlas accident were also utilized by the shuttle main engine. A direct lightning strike to the Atlas vehicle 
altered the core rnemry in a control unit causing the conpuler to issue an erroneous yaw mmmand that 
resulted in destnrction of the vehicle. The Space Shuttle Main Engine is a concern because the it 
contains 40 critical bw inertia memory eledrwJc cimits. Several changes were made to the wiring of the 
engine, e.g., braided cables were added for power, engine interface unit, and sensor interfaces. 
Shields were terminated on the outside of connector backshells to prevent lightning current from 
entering the chassis. However, unshiekied cabk was retained for actuators and this remains a waiver. 
The engines are protected from direct lightning strikes by the Orbiter structure with the exception of the 
nozzles. The engines are not used during decent or landing but then they are more exposed and 
subject to expensive repair if struck by lightning. The nozzles are heavy steel that should diffuse 
lightning current away from the lightning attach point without bum through. Tests were conducted on a 
simulated nozzle section in 1973. The nozzle section withstood 100 kA, 3 ms, discharges provided the 
air vetocity exceeded 40 Ws (90 mph), (31. 
Previous analysis qualified the Block I engine controller to a 50 kA strike level derived from an earlier 
revision of the lightning protedion specification. The analysis was for the indirect effects of coupling into 
cable harnesses by hghtning current in the Orkter skin. The new specification requires the Block II 
engine controller to be verified by test. Consideration of the direct effects to the nozzle during ascent 
and descent is also reguired. 
Flguro 5. SSME Lightning Protection Test 
Cable coupling must be readdressed and two tests are involved. The fins series of tests injects relatively 
low level surge currents (approximately 1000 amps), representative of lightning currents, into the 
Nozzle as shown in F i g 5  Tests were conducted in December 1990 and January 1991 at Stennis 
Space Center (SSC) on a flght engine with the engine controller replaced by a dummy controller and 
flight cables connected. Input and output impedances were simulated and current and voltage 
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measuremnts are taken. Measured values are extrapolated to determine the induced voltages and 
currents should a fun amplitude Eghtning current enter the engine. 
A sssond series of tests is performed with a flight engine controller. Tests are scheduled for April-May 
1991. Cumnts and voltages (induced cable coupling levels determined by previous tests) are injected, 
by transformer coupling, into the cables of a funclioning controller. 
SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER 
The Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) is illustrated in Fig.6. The Length is 46 m (1 50 ft) and the diameter is 3.7 
m (12.17 11). Major elemenis of the booster include a nose cap, the solid propellant segments, engine 
mule, and the systems tunnel. Some of the booster segments are pined by factory joints and some 
are field pints assembled at the KSC 
lightning protection concern because 
launch site. The design for the initial segment pints were a major 
they are apertures that could couple electromagnetic energy into 
Flgun 6. Solid Rocket Booster 
the solid propellant. The segment joints for the redesigned booster greatly reduce the potential to 
couple electric fields into the solid propellant. The steel case, approximately 1.3 cm (one-half inch) thick, 
eliminates the possibility of puncture due to lightning but does not completely eliminate all 
consideration for weakening the tank wall. The nose cap and other surface areas susceptible to 
aerodynamic heatiq are covered with insulation: typically 0.25 to 0.5 cm (one to two tenth inches) of 
cork. Vehicle electrorJcs are kxated in the forward skirt, External Tank attach rings, and in the aft skirt. 
The mapr conwm tor electronics is induced couphng into !he systems tunnel wiring that could cause 
upset or damage to any of 28 criticarty I circuits. 
Considerable adMty within the lightning protection and electrostatic discharge community, both military 
and NASA, resulted from the accidental ignition of a Pershing It motor during assembly operation in 
West Germany in January, 1985. Electrostatic charging and subsequent internal breakdown within the 
solid propellent, resutting from removing the first stage motor from its shipping case container, was 
determined to be the cause. Pershing propellant is more sensitive than the Shuttle solid rocket booster 
propellant and has a kevlar oomposite case rather than a steel case as does the booster. 
A simplified circuit for testing propellant sensitivity is shown in Fig.7. Test results for the 10 cm long 
samples indicated the booster propellant to be relatively insensitive at temperatures above -40 OC (- 
4OoF). The booster propellant, TP-Hl148, did not react at -23 to 24OC (-10 to +75OF) temperatures, for 
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voltages up to 30 kV and therefore the resutling field level of 300 kV/m (30 kV/O.l m) is considered to 
be safe for the booster propellant. 
I 
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Other tests and analyses evaluated induced electric fields from liihtning and microwaves under various 
conditions for the booster [4]. The electric field from lightning current inside the propellant following 
through booster pints was determined to be 35 kV/m and well bebw the accepted 300 kV/m safe level. 
However, the safe level was exceeded when individual booster segments were being shipped from the 
manufacturing plant in Utah to the Florida launch site. Segments, shipped by rail car, were initially 
protected by a fiberglass rail car cover and a fiberglass end grain cover over both ends of the segment. 
Field levels were reduced from 480 kV/m for an unprotected booster segment to 0.06 V/m when the 
segment was protected by a laminated aluminum rail car and end grain covers. Electric fields resulting 
from nicrowaves were well bebw the safe level (e.g., a worst case microwave environment produced a 
field of only 80 V/m inside the propellant near the booster pints.) 
The indirect effects of lihtning were also analyzed and tested. Electrical cabling is routed external to 
the booster and protected by systems tunnel shown in Fig.8. A lihtning strike to the systems tunnel 
Flgun 8. System Tunnel Bond Straps 
cover must fbw to the booster case through bond straps. The bond strap, shown in the figure, is 
kcated inside the systems tunnel. One end is bolted to the fkor plate and the other end is attached to 
the steel case with adhesive. Lightning tests were conducted on full size motor segments at Wendover, 
Utah in 1989 to determine the adequacy of the bond straps (51. Resub from the tests proved that the 
intemal bond straps were not adequate to 8uWe full lightning cumnts. EwcesSive current and voltage 
was induced inlo the electrical cables and also caused the internal bond strap to separate at the case 
end and the bose end sprang straight up from Its attachmea at the fbor. The bose end hit the linear 
shaped charge contained in the forward s tems tunnel. This necessitated sensitivity testing 01 the 
linear shaped charge to verify that detonation does not occur. 
A retest was cmjuctd in 1990, also at Wendover, Utah. The internal bond strap was replaced by more 
substantial external mer-to-case bond straps. Cover-tocover bond straps were also replaced with 
larger straps and all devebpment fight instmmentation cables were removed. Test results are not 
available but aW bond straps appear to have survived specified current and action interval limits and 
induced open drcdt common mode vohages are reduced from 130 V o b  to 30 to 60 Volts based on 
preliminary inhouse analysis. 
A final lightning current path to be disarmed is the lightning detach point. A likely detach point for 
lightning current is thmugh the booster exhaust plume. However, current must transverse Ilex gimbals 
and the nozzle before reaching the exhaust plume. The Ilex pnt is required because the engine must 
be gimballed to provlde thrust vector control. Lightning current must flow through bond straps 
connecting the boaster case to the nozzle. Bolts connecting to the bond straps to the mule extend 
through the nozzle and penetrate the inner carbon nozzle liner. The finer makes electrical contact with 
the plum. Another Wghtning current path for reaching the nozzle is though bond straps bypassing the 
engine actuators. Additional test and analysis sophistication considered the effect of bond strap failures 
that allow current to kop back toward the booster case near the propellant, and establish high electric 
fields . 
Three Dimensional Finite Difference Approach 
of Solving Maxwell's Equations 
(Electro Magnetic Applications, Inc.) 
Flgun 8. Numerical Technlgues 
Two Dimensional Pfqection 
Testing of the lightnino path from the booster case to the inside of the exit cone was perlormed at 
Wendover, Utah in 1988, [e]. This report is a noteworthy exawe of the analytical capa#lity required for 
lightning plotection analysis. Fig~m 9 is taken from the report to illustrate the numerical method of the 
finite difference technique ol mMng Maxwell's equations. The methud is implemented by establishing 
a grid, without undue mmpter memory requirements, to create a smaller simlated structure capable of 
repreSenHng the pertinent aspects of the rocket rmAOr. 
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OF POOR QUALITY 
Analysis and test E d t S  verified the capabilny to withstand 200 M with minor pitting at the screwlcarrbon 
liner Interface. The electric Mid strength within the propellant was 17 kV/m when all twelve case to 
nozzle bond straps and both actuator bond straps were in place. Bond straps were removed 
sequentially to simulate nozzle and actuator bond strap failures. The field strength increased to the 
extreme level of 430 kVlm for the limibng case when all nozzle and actuator straps were removed. Recall 
that the accapted safe level Is 300 kVlm. 
Two engineering changes might correct the major lightning protection shortcomings of the booster. 
One change Is being processed to replace the existing nose cap gasket with a conductive gasket. A 
second change is being evaluated to change the systems cable tunnel bond straps. The latest tests at 
Wendover, January 1991 , evaluated CaMe coupling into NASA standard initiator circuits for the nozzle 
severance system. A main lightning path coupon test is contemplated lo verify bond joints that must 
now be verified by analysis or test in accordance with Rev E to NSTS-07636. 
CONCLUSION 
Lightning protection for the Space Shuttle propulsion elements has been reviewed. Background 
information on the lightning speakation, pmgram history, and element descriptions provided a 
fomhtion lor dsa~ssing design concerns and the status of the present test and analysis efforts. The 
propulsion elements can no doubt survive certain intensity lightning strikes attaching to less vulnerable 
vehicle bcations durlng certain mission phases. The NASA lightning specification requites, as it shouki, 
that propulsion elements (and the Orbiter) withstand a very severe lightning model under all conditions. 
The Space Shuttle remains vulnerable in this respect and therefore efforts to improve the lightning 
protectin design for the Space Shuttle continue atter more than a decade of flight. 
To felbw lightning protection engineers at MSFC-SAIL and to the Shuttle propulsion element 
contradors and subcontractors who have performed the majority of the lightning protection work. 
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